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 1 
De-industrialization not decline: a new meta-narrative for post-war British 
history * 
 
In 1933, foreseeing a more nationally self-sufficient future, Keynes wrote ‘as wealth 
increases, both primary and manufacture products play a smaller relative part in the 
national economy compared with houses, personal services and local amenities which 
are not the subject of international exchange’. 1 This idea of a trajectory towards the 
predominance of service activity was put on a more substantial footing by AGB 
Fisher in 1935, and in Colin Clark’s foundational Conditions of Economic Progress, 
first published in 1940.2  Clark elaborated a version of the tripartite division of 
economic activity into primary (agricultural and fishing), secondary (industrial) and 
tertiary (services) which has subsequently become ubiquitous. 3 In the 1960s William 
Baumol argued that this sectoral shift posed serious dangers for the future, because 
many activities in the service sector were inherently labour intensive, and therefore if 
demand for them expanded disproportionately as incomes grew, more and more 
resources would have to be devoted to their production, and the rate of increase in 
                                                 
*I am grateful to my colleagues Jim Phillips and Neil Rollings for helpful comments, 
along with seminar audiences at York University, New York University and at the 
Economic History Conference at Telford, March 2015. None of these bear any 
responsibility for the statements made. 
 
 
1 ‘National self- sufficiency’ in John Maynard Keynes, Collected Writings vol. XXI (London, 1971), 
238; as Chris Godden has pointed out to me, Keynes position was part of a much wider on-going 
debate amongst inter-war British economists about the direction and significance of structural change. 
2 A.G.B. Fisher, The Clash of Progress and Security (London, 1935); C. Clark The Conditions of 
Economic Progress (London, 1940), especially Chapter V, ‘The flow of labour to tertiary production’. 
3 This broad division, with different terminologies, has a long history: E. Wrigley, ‘The PST system for 
classifying occupations.’ The Cambridge Group for the History of population and Social Structure,  
paper 20 at www.geog.cam.ac.uk/research/projects/occupations/abstracts/. (accessed 25 April 2015). 
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aggregate labour productivity would inevitably decline. 4 While Baumol’s original 
analysis arose from discussion of the performing arts, he later placed especial 
emphasis on the expansion of health and education, suggesting that by 2040 US 
medical spending might rise to 35 per cent of GDP, education to 20 per cent. 5 
 
These authors did not use the word ‘de-industrialization’, which seems not to 
have come into use to describe contemporary developments until the 1970s.6  But the 
process they described under that name has characterised Britain since 1950s (Table 
1). This paper argues that the process is so significant in its effects, economic, social, 
and political, that it should be central to our narratives about post-war Britain. This is 
not based on normative argument about the effects of that de-industrialization; if one 
were aiming at a ‘balance sheet’ of the consequences of that process then there would 
clearly be substantial elements on both the debit and credit side. For example, on the 
credit side, average non-industrial work is safer, cleaner, and less disease-inducing 
than industrial work.7  Some effects would not fit easily on either side: the reduction 
of employment in industry hit hardest in predominantly male sectors of the economy, 
and conversely facilitated the expansion of women’s paid employment. (This gender 
aspect is returned to in section III). But the aim here is not to draw up a balance sheet, 
but to emphasize the scale and speed of the process in Britain, and the consequently 
radical impacts, for good or ill. It is a historical argument about the transition from an 
                                                 
4 W. Baumol, ‘Macroeconomics of unbalanced growth: the anatomy of urban crisis’ American 
Economic Review 57 (1967), 415-426. 
5 W. Baumol, ‘Health care, education and the cost disease: a looming crisis for public choice’ Public 
Choice 77 (1993), 17-28. 
6 F. Blackaby (ed.), De-industrialisation (London, 1978). For other discussions of the 1970s: T. Sherif, 
A De-industrialized Britain, Fabian Society Pamphlet 341 (London, 1979). 
7 For changes in the quality of work in all dimensions, F. Green, Demanding Work.The Paradox of Job 
Quality in the Affluent Economy (Princeton, 2006). 
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industry to service-dominated economy in a particular period of time, rather than a 
comparison of the two in a ‘steady-state’. 8 
 
The existing narratives of post-war Britain offered by economic historians are 
dominated by issues of growth and decline, with many recent versions adding a 
further, post-Thatcher, twist of a purported growth ‘renaissance’ and reversal of 
decline since the 1980s.9 This paper argues that all growth/decline narratives are 
unhelpful, but the main purpose is to make the positive argument that a better ‘meta-
narrative’ would focus on the process of de-industrialization. The key claim is that de-
industrialization underpinned many features of UK economic and social development 
over the last sixty years. The effects of de-industrialization focused on here are not the 
claimed impact on growth or the balance of payments which dominated initial 
discussions in the 1970s, and remains a concern for some authors today. 10 Rather, the 
emphasis is on the impacts of de-industrialization on the labour market and the 
ramifications of these changes elsewhere in British society. Seen in this light, it is not 
too fanciful to suggest that this transition bears some comparison with the transition 
from an agricultural to an industrial economy, given its effects on income distribution, 
                                                 
8 The argument here conflicts with some historical literature which sees de-industrialization as a 
consequence of globalization, and therefore treats that latter as the key historical change: C. Johnson, 
‘De-industrialization and globalization’ International Review of Social History  47 (2002), 3-33; for 
this debate, see footnote 34 below. 
9  The current Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain  (CEHMB) Vol II (Cambridge, 2014) 
has two chapters with sharply conflicting accounts of the causes and chronology of decline: Kitson and 
Michie, ‘The de-industrial revolution: the rise and fall of UK manufacturing 1870-2010’ provide a 
Centre-Left version, Crafts, ‘Economic growth during the long twentieth century’ a Thatcherite one, 
very much in line with their previous writings: see Crafts ‘Deindustrialisation and economic growth’ 
Economic Journal 106 (1996), 172-83; Kitson and Michie, ‘Britain’s industrial performance since 
1960: underinvestment and relative decline’ Economic Journal 106 (1996), 196-212. For business 
history versions of growth and decline, see G.Owen, From Empire to Europe (London, 1999) and R. 
Coopey and P. Lyth (eds.), Business in Britain in the Twentieth Century  (Oxford, 2009).  
10  A. Singh, ‘UK industry and the world economy: a case of deindustrialisation?’ Cambridge Journal 
of Economics 1 (1977), 113-36.; Blackaby, De-industrialisation; R. Rowthorn and J.Wells, De-
industrialization and Foreign Trade (Cambridge, 1987); for an updated analysis, R. Rowthorn and 
R.Ramaswamy, ‘Growth, trade and de-industrialization’ IMF Research Department WP/98/60, 1998; 
K. Coutts and R. Rowthorn, ‘The UK balance of payments: structure and prospects’ Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy 29 (2013), 307-325. 
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unemployment, the gendered distribution of work and the shape of the social security 
system.  
 
The first section suggests why an emphasis on growth and decline is in many 
respects unhelpful in the way it structures our understanding. The second outlines the 
meaning of de-industrialization and some of ways it has been analysed. The third 
suggests how it has affected the distribution of economic welfare, while the fourth 
summarizes the arguments and offers some speculations on the broad-ranging 
political effects, especially in relation to the rise of neo-liberalism. This last point is 
especially emphasised because of the way this ‘rise’ threatens to become an under-
scrutinised, taken-as-read summary of recent decades in Britain. Neo-liberalism’s 
tensions and contradictions need to be assessed alongside its triumphs.   
     
I 
 
Economic growth and decline are terms very much rooted in post-war history.  Some 
of their limits as ways of understanding this period can be brought out by placing 
them firmly in the historical context which gave them birth. The focus on growth as a 
core narrative of economic history is a product of the 1950s and 1960s; as Crafts 
notes, the notion of ‘the central task of economic history as quantifying and 
explaining long-run growth’ was grounded in 1950 and 1960s concerns with 
economic development.11 Growth and decline go together; growth is the criterion of 
performance, decline the measurement of (relative) failure by that criterion. So we 
should start with growth. Like all broad analytic frameworks, the economic 
                                                 
11 N. Crafts, ‘Solow and growth accounting: a perspective from quantitative economic history’, History 
of Political Economy 41 (Annual Supplement 2009), 203. 
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historian’s focus on economic growth is rooted in a number of sources. Modern 
academic notions of economic growth came into prominence in the 1950s when inter-
war calculations of national income were formalised in the early post-war 
‘Standardised National Accounts’. 12 These were initially developed to help achieve 
short-term economic stabilisation, but were redeployed in the geo-political context of 
the Cold War to measure long-term economic change. The Cold War, and the concern 
with third world development, underpinned the production of both much more 
sophisticated statistical measures of economic performance, associated above all with 
the work of Simon Kuznets, and a generalization of such measures both 
geographically and chronologically. 13 
 
In policy circles within Britain, growth as an economic issue came into 
prominence in this broad geo-political context, but with an important domestic aspect 
also. In the 1950s arguments about the future trajectory of British society led to the 
perception that faster economic growth could deliver the goals of a range of political 
forces. For the Right it could deliver higher public spending whilst allowing for cuts 
in taxes. 14  For those on the Left it could aid the poor without having to overcome the 
resistance of the rich to any absolute fall in their incomes. 15 The argument that it is 
better to expand the cake than quarrel furiously over its division could attract (almost) 
all people of good will. Not least amongst these were mainstream economists, for 
                                                 
12 P. Studenski, The Income of Nations (New York, 1958). 
13 H. Arndt, The Rise and Fall of Economic Growth (Chicago, 1978) brings out the very specific 
historical context of the emergence of growth in the 1950s and 1960s, and the backlash which followed 
in the 1970s. 
14 Hence Macmillan’s ‘modernization’ drive in the early 1960s: N. Tiratsoo and J. Tomlinson, The 
Conservatives and Industrial Efficiency, (London 1998), 20-34, though the Conservative shift to a 
focus on growth is evident in the landmark White Paper of 1955, Economic Implications of Full 
Employment, Cmd. 9725. 
15 On the Left, Crosland’s The Future of Socialism (London,1956) is the locus classicus; for discussion 
of the politics of this, L.Black, The Political Culture of the Left in Affluent Britain, 1951-64 
(Basingstoke, 2003), especially 133-54. 
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whom economic growth meant choices could be expanded without the need to make 
any judgements about the relative merits of different ‘needs’ or other troubling 
features of older political economies. 16 
 
From the beginning there were doubts about the equation of economic growth 
and enhanced economic welfare. Kuznets, the key figure in the statistical revolution 
underpinning post-war growth measurement, was clear about the arbitrary character 
of focussing on the monetised transactions summed in GDP when measuring 
economic welfare.17 The inappropriateness of such an approach was initially 
emphasised by those concerned with the Third World, who especially saw the 
exclusion of much peasant subsistence production as wholly distorting. But the 
problem is more general: most welfare comes from non-market activities; from 
household production, or from not producing at all, that is, from leisure. 18   
 
Obvious problems also arise from average GDP/head data disguising shifts in the 
income distribution, and in recent decades masking the startling redistribution to the 
rich in the UK. Distortions also come from the arbitrary evaluation of government 
outputs, where problems in measuring the worth of non-market output lead to valuing 
outputs by the value of inputs, and hence ruling out any possibility of productivity 
changes. The attractions of growth to many economists is that it purports to make no 
judgement about how resources are used and so avoids ‘value judgements’ about how 
                                                 
16 The emphasis on expanding choice is strongly articulated in a key pioneer work, A. Lewis, The 
Theory of Economic Growth (London, 1955), Appendix. 
17  S. Kuznets, The Structure of US National Income 1919-1939 (New York, 1941); for recent critiques: 
J. Stiglitz, A. Sen, J-P Fitoussi, Mis-measuring our Lives: why GDP doesn’t Add Up (New York, 
2010); D. Coyle, GDP: a Brief but Affectionate History (Princeton, 2014); R. Skidelsky and 
E.Skidelsky, How Much is Enough? The Love of Money and the Case for the Good Life (London, 
2012).  
18 A. Offer, ‘Economic welfare measurements and human well-being’ in P. David and M. Thomas 
(eds.), The Economic Future in Historical Perspective (Oxford, 2003), 374. 
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people choose to enjoy enhanced economic welfare. But, as has long been pointed-
out, GDP includes the output items of ‘illfare’ as well as welfare; increased cigarette 
manufacture, and increased cancer services are added together. 
 
These issues are well known, and can be found in any standard economics 
textbook. Most commentators acknowledge these issues—but then move on to focus 
on GDP growth!  But even amongst ‘orthodox’ economists there have been important 
attempts to provide more adequate concepts.19 Criticisms of GDP have in recent years 
come especially from two sources. First, from those concerned with economic 
development, has come the Human Development Index, based on the capabilities 
approach, which has been widely adopted as giving a better, liberal, underpinning for 
judging development. One important feature of HDI is that it builds in an assumption 
of diminishing returns to higher incomes, so that in poor countries GDP growth boosts 
welfare substantially, but in higher income countries much less so.  
 
The other recently prominent strand of critique of GDP arises from the new 
utilitarian approach, which seeks to show that systematic evidence of happiness and 
well-being does not correlate with economic growth. 20 This has backed up evidence 
of older claims that there is an ‘Easterlin paradox’, which suggests subjective views of 
happiness do increase with income in any given country at a particular point in time, 
but that such a relationship does not hold between countries nor over time. 21 
 
                                                 
19 Offer, ‘Economic welfare’, 371-99.  
20 R. Layard, Happiness, Lessons from a New Science (New York, 2005). Amongst economic 
historians there has been an important strand of work using height as measure of welfare, but most of 
this work focuses on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, rather than more recent history:  R. 
Steckel and R. Floud (eds.), Health and Welfare during Industrialization  (Chicago, 1997). 
21 R. Easterlin, ‘Does economic growth improve the human lot? Some empirical evidence’ in P. David 
and M. Reder (eds), Nations and Households in Economic Growth (New York, 1974), 89-125. 
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For the more recent past Crafts has shown how HDI measures move broadly 
in line with income, but reduce the gaps between rich countries compared with GDP 
figures. 22  Also, very importantly, taking into account hours worked greatly reduces 
the perceived advance of the East Asian ‘tigers’, where in recent years hours have 
risen contrary to the trends across Europe. 23 
 
The overall conclusion of this debate is best summed-up by Avner Offer: ‘A 
common pattern emerges: the relation of economic welfare and welfare overall is 
historically contingent. They all suggest a curvilinear relationship between economic 
welfare and human welfare. Using extended accounting and social indicators, 
international comparisons suggest an historical cycle of two periods. In the first, 
economic growth provides high welfare pay-offs, as basic deprivations are remedied 
and basic needs are satisfied. In the second phase, GDP goods provide diminishing, 
steady or even negative returns, depending on the measure used.’ 24 
 
Such a conclusion suggests one reason why we should treat accounts of 
Britain’s decline as unhelpful: ‘decline’ of relative GDP is in principle a problematic 
criterion for assessing changes in economic welfare in a rich country such as Britain. 
Like Arndt’s analysis of rise and decline of growth, we should see the emphasis on 
decline as a product of a particular conjunction of ideological and political conditions, 
and its continuing deployment as a reflection of how well it meets certain ideological 
‘needs’. 
                                                 
22 In a broader context Crafts understandably emphasizes how rising life expectancies in poor countries 
give a much more optimistic view of their welfare levels than GDP comparisons: N. Crafts, ‘The 
Human Development Index, 1870-1999: some revised estimates’ European Review of Economic 
History 6 (2002), 395-405.  
23 N.Crafts, ‘Britain’s Relative Economic Decline 1870-1995 : a Quantitative Perspective (London, 
1997), 9-10, 17-21 
24 Offer, ‘Economic welfare’, 391; emphasis added. 
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The history of declinism has been outlined elsewhere. 25  Like growth, it needs 
to be located in a specific historical context. In summary, we can say that initially, in 
the context of the growth debate of the 1950s and 1960s noted above, it functioned as 
a stick for Centre-Left ideologues and politicians to beat the Conservative government 
of 1951-64. By the 1970s it had mutated politically to become a keystone of the neo-
liberal attack on the ‘post-war consensus’, and was used with great effect in that way 
by Thatcher and her allies. 26 Post-Thatcher it has been argued by some on the Left to 
argue that decline continues, but the predominant view amongst the political class is 
that Thatcher halted decline. 27 This conventional wisdom has been endorsed, albeit 
with qualifications, by some economic historians. 28  
 
Is ‘decline’ an appropriate word to summarise the trajectory of post-1945 
Britain? 29 According to IMF data for 2012, Britain is ranked twenty-first in the 
ranking of GDP/head, the only large countries with a higher level being the USA 
                                                 
25 J.Tomlinson, ‘Inventing “Decline”: the falling behind of the British economy in the post-war years’ 
Economic History Review 49 (1996), 731-57. For other sceptical assessments of declinism see A. 
Booth, ‘The manufacturing failure hypothesis’ Economic History Review and D. Edgerton, England 
and the Aeroplane (Basingstoke, 1991) and P. Temin, ‘The Golden Age of European growth 
reconsidered’ European Review of Economic History 6 (2002), 3-22. 
26 D. Cannadine, ‘Apocalpyse when? British Politicians and British “decline” in the twentieth century’, 
in P. Clarke and C. Trebilcock (eds.), Understanding Decline (Cambridge, 1997), 261-84; E.Green, 
Thatcher (2006), 55-82. 
27 The ‘decline continues’ theme can be found in L. Elliott and D. Atkinson, Going South: Why Britain 
will have a Third World Economy by 2014 (London, 2012); and in more sophisticated terms in E. 
Engelen, I. Erturk, J. Froud, S.Johal, A.Leaver, M.Moran, A. Nilsson and K. Williams, After the Great 
Complacence. Financial Crisis and the Politics of Reform (Oxford, 2011). 
28 N. Crafts, The Conservative Government’s Economic Record: an End of Term Report (London, 
1998); also Crafts ‘Was the Thatcher experiment worth it? British economic growth in a European 
context’ in A.Szirmai, B van Ark and D.Pilat (eds.), Explaining Economic Growth (Amsterdam, 1993), 
327-50.  
29 It should be taken for granted we are talking about relative decline, though both in the 1970s and in 
the recent crisis there was talk of Britain becoming a ‘third world country’ which strongly suggested 
absolute decline;  P. Jenkins, The Anatomy of Decline (London, 1996);  Elliott and Atkinson, Going 
South. 
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(sixth) and Germany (seventeenth). 30 The USA overtook Britain in the late 
nineteenth century, so the only large country to overtake Britain post-1945 is 
Germany, where in 2012 GDP/head was around six per cent higher. For a historian 
the German comparison is especially resonant. In Made in Germany in 1896 the 
impending doom of Britain was spelt out; one hundred and twenty years later the 
difference in GDP/head barely exceeds the measurement error. 31 
 
One final issue relating to GDP measurement and economic welfare relates to 
productivity. It is normal to see higher productivity as the key route to higher GDP, 
but much less common to bring out how higher productivity may be predicated on 
welfare-reducing processes. For example, it is a commonplace of literature discussing 
lagging productivity in Britain to link this to lamentations about alleged opposition to 
work intensification, without recognising that such intensification must, in welfare 
terms, be put in the balance against the benefits of higher output.32 
 
This section has had an unavoidably negative tone. However, by suggesting 
some of the profound limitations of the framework of growth and decline, the need for 
a more useful term is clear, and this is the role de-industrialization can play. 
 
     II 
 
                                                 
30 IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2013. The great bulk of the world’s population have less 
than a quarter of this figure. 
31 In 1999 the HDI measures for Germany and the UK were almost indistinguishable: 0.921 and 0.923 
respectively: Crafts, ‘The Human Development Index, 1870-1999: some revised estimates’ European 
Economic History Review 6 (2002), 397, Table 3.  
32 For example, Broadberry ascribes the slow growth of the ‘modern office’ in Britain compared with 
the USA to poorer educational standards and ‘stronger labour force resistance to the intensification of 
the labour process’: S. Broadberry, Market Services and the Productivity Race 1850-2000: British 
Performance in International Perspective (Cambridge, 2006), 5-6. For evidence that such 
intensification is normal across the British economy in recent years: Green, Demanding Work, 44-93. 
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De-industrialization is a complex term, and this section seeks to address some of these 
complexities, first by laying out some definitional clarifications, then by looking at 
the diverse ways different academic disciplines have deployed the term. This lays the 
groundwork for the specific, empirical, deployment of the term developed in section 
III. 
 
The focus here is on the employment aspects of de-industrialization: this is 
based on the claim that the radical decline in industrial employment has been a major 
force shaping post-war Britain. It also needs to be emphasized that such significance 
might be attached to de-industrialization in other rich countries, given that the 
process, in broad outline at least, is common to them all. 33 The reasons for this 
international trend are changes in the composition of demand, relatively rapid growth 
in productivity in manufactures and, more contentiously, international competition 
from poor countries.34  
 
Why should we focus on these changing patterns of employment? Primarily 
because of their links to economic welfare. The post-war period, despite the hopes of 
some, has not seen the demise of the reliance of the great bulk of the population on 
wage income. There has been a clear failure to move to ‘asset-based’ welfare, and 
with recent postponements in state pensions, the ending of final salary occupational 
                                                 
33  A.Pilat, A. Cimper, K. Olsen and C.Webb, The Changing Nature of Manufacturing in OECD 
Countries, (OECD, Paris 2006). 
34 This last is particularly controversial, bearing as it does on the question of the impact of 
globalization: for different views P. Krugman and R.Lawrence, ‘Trade, jobs and wages’ Scientific 
American 270 (1994), 44-9; A. Wood, ‘How trade hurt unskilled workers’ Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 9 (1995), 57-80; R. Hine and P. Wright, ‘Trade with low wage economies: employment 
and productivity in UK manufacturing’ Economic Journal 108 (1998), 1500-1510; M. Gregory, B. 
Zissimos and C. Greenhalgh, ‘Jobs for the skilled: how technology, trade and domestic demand 
changed the structure of UK employment, 1979-90’ Oxford Review of Economic Policy 53 (2001), 20-
46. On demand changes, Feinstein ‘Structural change’, 40-43. 
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schemes and the extension of working lives, this situation is likely to continue. 35 In a 
different register, the project of a ‘property-owning democracy’ espoused by the Right 
and some elements of the Centre-Left, has turned out in practice to have results 
almost entirely in housing. 36 While this has given economic security to some, it has 
distributed that security unevenly, and may have contributed to macroeconomic 
instability. 37 So the traditional understanding that under capitalism most people 
continue to rely on waged work for economic welfare remains accurate. 
 
Discussing de-industrialization in relation to its employment effects raises 
complex definitional issues. On the statistical side, some of the measured decline of 
manufacturing, the largest component of ‘industry’, results from manufacturing 
companies spinning – off support activities into business services firms. This sectoral 
shift followed on from a long period of growth of non-production activities in 
manufacturing companies, with, most importantly, ‘professional staff’ growing most 
rapidly, from 3.2 per cent of all staff in manufacturing industry in 1951 to 7.1 per cent 
in 1971.38 This process may also tend to lead to statistical over-estimation of the size 
of manufacturing in Germany, where such splitting-off from manufacturing 
companies has been less prevalent. 39 Nevertheless, while the statistics are 
questionable at the margins, the broad picture is indisputable; however narrowly or 
                                                 
35 J. Froud, S. Johal, J. Montgomerie and K. Williams, ‘Escaping the tyranny of earned income? The failure of 
finance as social innovation’ New Political Economy 15 (2010), 147-64. 
36 B. Jackson, ‘Revisionism Reconsidered: “Property-owning democracy in post-war Britain’ Twentieth Century 
British History 16 (2005), 416-40. 
37 On the distribution, J. Wadsworth, ‘Eyes down for a full house: labour market polarisation and the 
housing market in Britain’ Scottish Journal of Political Economy 45 (1998), 376-92; A. Hood and R. 
Joyce, ‘The economic circumstances of cohorts born between the 1940s and 1970s’ Institute for Fiscal 
Studies, 2013; on the destabilising effects: A. Offer, ‘Narrow banking, real estate and financial stability 
in the UK, c.1870-2010’ in N. Dimsdale and A. Hotson (eds.), British Financial Crises since 1825 
(Oxford, 2014). 
38 R. Crum and G. Gudgin, Non-production Activities in UK Manufacturing Industry, (Commission of 
the EC, Brussels, 1977), 11. 
39 B. van Ark, ‘Sectoral growth accounting and structural change in post-war Europe’ in van Ark and 
N.Crafts (eds), Quantitative Aspects of Post-War Economic History (Cambridge, 1996), 84-164. 
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widely we think of ‘industry’, the numbers engaged in it have radically declined in 
Britain since the 1950s/1960s. 
 
Which definition of ‘industry’ we use should be conditioned by the issues we 
are concerned with. The big distinctions between industry, services and agriculture in 
modern statistics are designed to differentiate between types of output, not 
employment. So any use of the distinctions to discuss employment has to accept that 
if the scale of employment in industry is important this is not inherent in the 
categorization, but historically contingent. The same point can be applied when we 
differentiate within ‘industry’. Much economic discussion is focussed specifically on 
manufacturing, often because of arguments about this sector’s capacity to raise 
productivity and hence growth, but if we are concerned with employment we can 
draw the boundary on a somewhat broader basis. 
 
For the purposes of the current argument we are concerned with economic 
sectors which, historically, have offered large amounts of regular, relatively well-paid 
employment to working-class people with relatively limited educational 
qualifications. 40 Or, to put it another way, the sectors of employment which 
historically underpinned the existence of a distinctive industrial working class.  In 
other words, de-industrialization is defined to capture the belief that as a process it 
had both major economic welfare and broader political economy consequences.    
 
With this logic in mind, we here treat de-industrialization as concerned with decline in 
employment in industry, which as officially defined equals manufacturing plus 
                                                 
40 Or perhaps, following Bourdieu, we should say ‘relatively little cultural capital’; for an integration of 
this term with other analyses of class see M. Savage et al ‘A new model of social class?: findings from 
the BBC’s Great British Class survey experiment’ Sociology 47 (2013), 219-250.  
 14 
mining plus construction. This is the figure which is most widely available and on a 
comparative basis.  But while the same kind of systematic data is not available if we 
extend the definition, we might also want to include in our narrative some recognition 
of employment in railways and utilities, which fall outside that definition of industry, 
but could be included on the basis outlined in the previous paragraph. 41 Even this 
extended category does not, of course, include all manual workers, excluding as it 
does those in the service sector and agriculture. Equally obviously, it does not equate 
with the whole of the working class in the broadest sense of all those reliant on wage 
labour, which would amount to over ninety per cent of the population. 42 
 
Individual industries have, of course, declined from the beginning of industrial 
capitalism; here the focus is on overall sectoral contraction. Saul talked about de-
industrialization before the First World War, but while the service sector was growing 
at this time, this was primarily at the expense of agriculture. 43 Numbers in industry 
declined after 1921 with the collapse of the old staples, but overall services growth 
was constrained by the rapid decline of domestic service. Industrial employment 
surged across the Second World War to levels only matched in Germany, and initially 
this level was sustained by protective devices needed to offset the balance of 
payments consequences of wartime losses of foreign assets. Peak employment in 
                                                 
41 Broadberry, Market Services, 34, calculates that employment in transport and communications fell 
from 7.9 per cent of the labour force in 1950 to 5.5 per cent in 1990. 
42 Hobsbawm’s famous article uses non-agricultural manual workers, and on that basis says figures 
show fall from about 75 per cent in 1911, to 70 per cent in 1931, 64 per cent in 1961 and a little over 
half in 1976: E. Hobsbawm, ‘The forward march of labour halted?’ Marxism Today, September 1978, 
279-86. There has been an upward trend in levels of self-employment (as well as sharp cycles), but 
much of this seems to be a reflection of the weakness of the labour market. 
43 S.Saul, Industrialisation and De-industrialisation: the Interaction of the German and British 
Economies before the First World War (London, 1979).  
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industry was in the 1950s, when declines in textiles, coal and railways began to be 







Table 1: A common European pattern: industrial employment peaks 
 Peak year % in industry 
in peak year 
% in industry 
in 1998 
% fall, peak to 
1998 
UK 1955 47.9 26.6 44.5 
Belgium 1957 47.0 26.1 44.5 
Switzerland 1964 48.8 26.3 46.1 
Netherlands 1965 41.1 22.2 46.0 
Sweden 1965 42.8 25.7 40.0 
West Germany 1970 49.3 35.0 29.0 
Italy 1971 39.7 31.9 19.6 
France 1973 39.5 25.2 36.2 
 
Source: C.Feinstein, ‘Structural change in the developed countries in the twentieth century’ Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy 15 (1999), 39. 
 
                                                 
44 R. Rowthorn and J. Wells, De-industrialization and Foreign Trade (Cambridge,1987), 10. 
45 R.Rowthorn, ‘De-industrialisation in Britain’, 6; outside textiles, much early de-industrialisation in 
Britain was in the nationalised sector; it was the unintended fate of this sector to manage a policy of 
‘humane decline’: J.Tomlinson, ‘A “failed experiment”? Public ownership and the narratives of post-
war Britain’ Labour History Review 73 (2008), 199-214. 
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De-industrialization reached a crescendo in 1979-82, when a grossly 
overvalued exchange rate rendered large swathes of British industry uncompetitive, 
and industrial output fell by twenty per cent. As the Prime Ministerial adviser, John 
Hoskyns, noted in his memoirs, the Thatcher government had ‘accidentally 
engineered’ a major recession by its misguided adherence to monetary targets and  
‘done the economy a great deal of damage by mistake’. 46  Relative sectoral decline 
continued thereafter, and was rapid again in the ‘great complacence’ after the mid-
1990s.47  
 
It is important to emphasize the long-term nature of this change. The 1979-82 
episode was extraordinary in its speed and extent, but the process began much earlier, 
as suggested above. While the stress in the literature on the radical effects of the 
Thatcher period is understandable, it gives a very misleading picture of the 
chronology and, by implication, the processes at work. 48 It also ignores the very 
different contexts in which the process took place, and the extent to which its effects 
were offset. 49  
 
De-industrialization in Britain has been analysed from a number of 
disciplinary perspectives. As already noted, beginning in the 1970s, economists have 
                                                 
46 Cited in D. Needham, ‘ Britain’s money supply experiment, 1971-73’ English Historical Review 130 
(2015), 89; also J.Tomlinson, ‘Mrs Thatcher’s macroeconomic adventurism, 1979-1981, and its 
political consequences’ British Politics 2 (2007), 3-19. 
47 Figures in Engelen et al, Great Complacence, 214. 
48 Owen Jones, Chavs.The Demonization of the Working Class (2nd ed. 2012), while persuasive in many 
respects about the ideological consequences of de-industrialization, treats it as a process which began 
only in 1979. 
49 J. Phillips, ‘The moral economy and de-industrialization in the Scottish coalfields, 1947-1991’, 
International Labor and Working Class History, 84 (2013), 99-115; also Phillips, ‘Class and industrial 
relations in Britain: the “long” mid-century and the case of port transport c.1920-70’ Twentieth Century 
British History 16 (2005), 52-73. 
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tended to focus upon its impact on the balance of payments and growth. Also a 
product of the 1970s was the work of Bacon and Eltis, which linked de-
industrialization to the excessive growth of the non-market (public) sector, allegedly 
leading to the crowding out of labour supply to industry. 50 Few were persuaded by 
the analysis, but the arguments added to the panicky declinism of the 1970s by linking 
it to de-industrialization. But other declinists have argued strongly that de-
industrialization is not the cause of Britain’s ‘decline’, whose roots are to be sought 
elsewhere. 51  
 
An entirely different literature, macro-sociological in character, discussed de-
industrialization in epochal terms as marking the end of industrial society. Bell’s book 
of this title unleashed a torrent of work which sought to find an appropriate term to 
describe this new epoch: the service economy, the information society etc.52 
Sociology at this level of generality may not have much to offer directly to the 
historian of post-war Britain, though there is less grand and more empirical work from 
which historians can learn much. Perhaps most important is that of Gershuny, who 
focuses on the labour market and work consequences of de-industrialization.53 
 
More prominent in the literature has been the focus on industrial closures and 
their effects, which has generated a vast academic and political literature. 54 Much of 
                                                 
50 R. Bacon and W. Eltis, Britain’s Economic Problem: Too Few Producers. For a critique: G. 
Hadjiamatheou and A. Skouras, ‘Britain’s economic problem: the growth of the non-market sector?’  
Economic Journal 89 (1979), 402-415. 
51 N. Crafts, Can De-industrialization Seriously Damage your Wealth? (London, 1993) also W. 
Rubinstein, Capitalism, Culture and Decline in Britain 1750-1990 (London, 1993). 
52 D. Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society (London, 1974).  
53 J. Gershuny, After Industrial Society (London, 1978); J. Gershuny and I. Miles The New Service 
Economy (London, 1983). 
54 Examples, R. Martin and R. Rowthorn (eds.), The Geography of Deindustrialization (London, 1986); 
D. Massey  and R. Meegan, The Anatomy of Job Loss: the How, Where and Why of Employment 
Decline (London,1982); J. Foster and C. Woolfson, The Politics of the UCS Work-in: Class Alliances 
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this reflected an understandable anger and despair at the fate of communities hit by 
the decline of particular sectors, buts its purpose was only partially to place these 
closures  into a broader historical perspective. Nevertheless, the sense of the 
profundity of effects of the rapid loss of industrial employment conveys a hugely 
important truth about post-war Britain which needs to be retained and developed.  
 
Some economic historians have followed economists in seeing the main 
significance of de-industrialization in terms of its impact on growth; both 
contributions to the new Cambridge Economic History noted above follow this 
path. 55 Others have analysed the rise of the service sector, but not paid detailed 
attention to the correlate of declining industrial employment. 56  
 
     III 
The most useful analytic starting point for the historical argument here is the political 
economy literature on de-industrialization. This starts from the broad generalisation 
that the industrial and service sector are differentiated in labour market terms, with 
industry characterised much more by job-specific skills, while services require much 
more generic skills, albeit at very variable levels of sophistication. Using this 
generalisation as a basis, and placing developments in a comparative European 
perspective, this literature posits a ‘trilemma’ arising from de-industrialization. This 
suggests that, starting from a large share of industrial employment in the 1950s and 
                                                                                                                                            
and the Right to Work (London, 1986); H. Levie, D. Gregory and N.Lorentzen (eds.), Fighting 
Closures: De-industrialization and the Trade Unions (Nottingham, 1984). 
55 See also Crafts, Can De-industrialization? 
56 Broadberry, Market Services and idem., ‘The rise of the service sector’ in CEHMB vol II, 330-61; R. 
Millward, ‘Productivity in the UK services sector: historical trends 1856-1985 and comparison with the 
USA 1950-1985’ Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 52 (1990), 423-36 and R. Millward, ‘The 
rise of the service economy’ in R.Floud and P. Johnson (eds.), The CEHMB vol. III Structural Change 
and Growth, 1939-2000 (Cambridge, 2004), 238-66. 
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1960s, and broadly egalitarian patterns of wage differences between industry and 
services, the expansion of low productivity services meant that countries had to either 
allow more inequality in wages between sectors; or, if service sector wages are kept 
broadly in line with those in industry, less demand for labour will lead to more 
unemployment; or, thirdly, spend more money on public employment to create 
relatively well-paid service sector jobs. 57  
One of problems of the original version of this argument was that it followed 
Baumol’s argument that all private sector services are low productivity. But as 
Broadberry shows, historically some services have raised their productivity 
substantially by ‘industrialising’. 58 Recent work by political economists such as 
Wren accepts this, focusing on the significance of the ICT revolution, and arguing 
that this has reduced the force of the trilemma, so in part weakening Keynes’ 
assumption that service expansion necessarily expands the sheltered sector of the 
economy. But it has by no means refuted it.59  Even for the most recent period, this 
process of ‘industrialising’ services has by no means exposed all services to 
international competition, and it remains an important historical generalisation that 
many services are sheltered, low productivity activities. 
 
However, there are obvious dangers in over-generalising about such a huge 
employment sector as services, which now makes up over 80 per cent of the economy. 
The British data don’t show a significant divergent trend in average wages between 
the ‘production’ or ‘manufacturing’ sectors and services. But there is evidence that 
                                                 
57 T. Iversen and A.Wren, ‘Equality, employment and the budgetary restraint: the trilemma of the 
service economy’ World Politics 50 (1998), pp.507-46; T.Iversen and T. Cusack,‘The causes of 
welfare expansion: de-industrialization or globalization?’ World Politics 52 (2000), 313-49.  
58  Broadberry, Market Services. 
59 A.Wren, M. Fodor and S.Theodoporoulou, ‘The trilemma revisited: institutions, inequality and 
employment creation in an era of ICT-intensive service expansion’ in Wren (ed.), The Political 
Economy of the Service Transition  (Oxford, 2013), 108-146. 
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within services there has been a notable divergence in wage levels, summarised in the 
idea of ‘polarization’.60 This thesis argues that technological change has displaced 
many routine, mid-income jobs, but led to the expansion of jobs that at the top end 
require non-routine cognitive skills, and at the bottom end, non-routine manual skills. 
(While services have seen a ‘bifurcation’ in the labour employed between the lowest 
and highest skilled and rewarded, manufacturing has seen a clear ’up-skilling’ taking 
place, with the numbers with no qualifications employed in manufacturing falling 
from 26 per cent in 1993 to 8 per cent in 2013, whilst those with first degrees rose 
from 7 to 16 per cent.61) 
 
The rapid growth in low paid jobs in the service sector is suggested in the 












                                                 
60 Sectoral average earnings in ONS Economic Trends;  M. Goos and A. Manning, ‘Lousy and Lovely 
Jobs: the rising polarisation of work in Britain’ Review of Economics and Statistics 89 (2007), 118-133. 
 
61 M. Hardie and A. Banks, ‘The changing shape of UK manufacturing’ Office for National Statistics, 





Table 2: Growth of low skill occupations, 1979-1999. 
 
 1979 1999 Percentage increase 
Care assistants and 
attendants 
103,837 539,407 419.5 
Bar staff 119,455 188,319 57.6 
Shelf fillers 49,699 97,144 95.5 
Sales assistants 954,200 1,321,251 38.5 
Retail cash desk 
and checkout 
operators 
112,816 218,581 93.7 
Waiters and 
waitresses 
124,780 187,391 50.2 
Beauticians 24,536 28,946 18.0 
 
Source: M. Goos and A. Manning, ‘Lousy and lovely jobs. The rising polarisation of work in Britain’  
Review of Economics and Statistics 89 (2007), 124-5. 
 
This polarization of services has been one way in which de-industrialization 
has contributed to inequality. Britain experienced a sharp rise in inequality of incomes 
from the late 1970s, flattening out in the early 1990s.62 This rise in inequality was due 
to a number of causes, including cuts in social security benefits and the weakening of 
                                                 
62 A. Atkinson, Inequality. What Can Be Done? (London, 2015), 19-20.  
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trade unions (itself linked to de-industrialization—see below). But a key driver has 
been the polarization of the labour market: ‘wage inequality is significantly higher 
now than it was some thirty years ago. This is true for men and women, and is the 
case in both the upper and lower halves of the distribution.’63  Machin calculates the 
ratio between 90th and 10th percentiles for the period 1970 to 2009, and suggests that 
in that period this dispersion rose by approximately 50 per cent.64  This polarization 
maps on to the pattern of job growth, with growth at each end of the distribution 
defined by their median occupational wage.65 
 
The long-run trend associated with structural change in twentieth century 
Britain was towards higher demand for more skilled labour, and the supply of such 
labour has risen also. 66 But there remain large number of poorly-skilled (or 
redundantly-skilled) workers which the pace of de-industrialization has left behind. In 
addition, as noted above, the ‘service economy’ brings large numbers of poorly paid 
and insecure jobs along with those which are highly-skilled and well paid. 
 
Almost all the ‘lousy jobs’ listed in Table 2 are disproportionately done by 
women, many of them on a part-time basis. As Connolly and Gregory put it, ‘Women 
working full-time, who are increasingly the equal of men in education and 
qualifications, do rather different jobs from men, in different professions and in 
offices rather than factories, but at broadly the same occupational level. Women who 
                                                 
63 S. Machin, ‘Changes in UK wage inequality over the last forty years’ in P. Gregg and J. Wadsworth 
(eds.), The Labour Market in Winter (Oxford, 2011), 157. Alongside this trend has been growing 
wealth inequality, linked in part to the rent-seeking activities of the ‘working rich’:  M. Savage and K. 
Williams, ‘Elites: remembered in capitalism and forgotten by social sciences’ in Savage and Williams 
(ed.), Remembering Elites (Oxford, 2008), 11. 
64 Machin, ‘Changes’, pp.157-8. 
65 Goos and Manning, ‘Lousy and lovely jobs’. 
66 Feinstein, ‘Structural change’, 47. 
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work part-time, on the other hand, remain significantly less well-qualified, are under-
represented in the higher-level occupations, and are concentrated into a relatively 
narrow range of lower-level jobs.’  67 
 
So the impact of de-industrialization on women’s employment has been 
complex. The decline of industrial employment has destroyed large numbers of jobs 
for both men and women, but many more of the former. In addition, the women’s jobs 
which have gone were disproportionately in the poorly-paid textile and clothing 
sector. Conversely, the expansion of the service sector has helped open up the range 
of opportunities for women, but they have participated fully in the polarization 
process that has accompanied this opening-up. 
 
One response to this trend towards a large numbers of poorly paid jobs, 
concentrated in services, was the introduction of a national minimum wage (most of 
the old Wages Councils having been abolished in the 1980s). The impact of wage 
polarization has been partially mitigated by the expansion of in-work benefits, most 
importantly tax credits and housing benefit. 
 
In this way structural changes in the labour market have brought about 
profound changes in the social security system. It is not only that these in-work 
benefits have come to greatly exceed payments made to the unemployed (returned to 
below), but the whole principle of post-war welfare has shifted. The classic mid-
twentieth century Beveridge analysis of the sources of poverty suggested the problem 
fundamentally lay in ‘interruption to earnings’ (by unemployment, sickness or age) 
                                                 
67 S. Connolly and M. Gregory, ‘Women and work since 1970’ in N. Crafts, I. Gazeley and A. Newell 
(eds.), Work and Pay in Twentieth Century Britain (Oxford, 2007), 156. 
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along with large numbers of children, the latter to be addressed by ‘Family 
Allowances’ (later, Child Benefit). 68 While this analysis always misrepresented the 
labour market, not least in its barely-qualified notion of the ‘male-breadwinner 
household’, its fundamental idea that normally paid work would provide a route out of 
poverty has underpinned most modern understandings of how society works down to 
the present day. What has changed in the period of de-industrialization has been the 
numbers earning very low wages, and being supported by in-work benefits.  
 
Evidence of these trends can be found in the rise of in-work poverty, a central 
feature of the post-industrial period. While in the industrial period employment did 
not guarantee an above-poverty income, most poverty was amongst non-workers (the 
sick and disabled, pensioners, single mothers), or those with unusually large families. 
Abel-Smith and Townsend showed that in 1960 about 40 per cent of households in 
poverty (those below 140 per cent of the then National Assistance level) had a 
working member. But overwhelmingly they also had a large number (four or more) 
children 69. Recent work suggests that a majority of the poor are now members of 
households with at least one member in work: ‘As pensioner poverty is now at low 
levels, the rate of in-work poverty is the most distinctive characteristic of poverty 
today’.70  A different calculation suggests that whereas in the 1970s 3-4 per cent of 
employed households were in poverty, the figure by 2000/1 was 14 per cent. Between 
1975 and the mid-1990s, the incidence of low pay for men in the labour market has 
doubled. 71  
                                                 
68 A. Cutler, K. Williams and J.Williams, Keynes, Beveridge and Beyond (London, 1986). 
69 B. Abel-Smith and P.Townsend, The Poor and the Poorest (London, 1963), 49. 
70 Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Monitoring Poverty and Social Exclusion (London, 2012), 1-2: K. 
Lawton, Nice Work If You Can Get It (London, Institute for Public Policy Research, 2009).  
71 M. Stewart, ‘Low Pay in Britain’ in P. Gregg and J. Wadsworth (eds.), The State of Working Britain 
(Manchester, 1999), 225-48. 
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Unemployment levels have increased since the 1970s, with three major slumps 
each pushing measured unemployment over the two million mark. 72  But alongside 
these cycles, whose relationship to de-industrialization cannot be readily assessed, has 
come a rise in chronic unemployment. This has been partly hidden by the rise in 
incapacity benefit, which has acted to disguise the weakness of labour demand. 
Estimates of the ‘real’ level of unemployment, making allowances for this weakness, 
suggest that even in the good times unemployment has been much higher than in the 
‘golden age’. Thus for January 2007 Beatty et al calculate a rate of 7.2 per cent, 
measured as the sum of  claimant levels (2.6 per cent), plus 1.8 per cent under the ILO 
measure (‘actively seeking work’) and 2.9 per cent for hidden unemployment amongst 
those on Incapacity Benefit. 73 There is other good evidence, for example from 
Glasgow, that the number of incapacity claimants is, as Beatty et al’s calculations 
suggest, largely a function of the strength of the demand for labour.74 
 
Unemployment after the 1970s had a strong regional dimension, continuing a 
pattern  which first appeared in the 1920s. This is most clearly shown in inactivity 
rates, which show greater divergence than official unemployment rates.75  Alongside 
this geographical distribution are continuing important intra-regional disparities, 
especially between inner-city areas on the one hand and suburban and rural areas on 
the other. These latter disparities remind us of the important point that de-
                                                 
72 T. Hatton and G. Boyer, ‘Unemployment and the UK labour market before, during and after the 
Golden Age’ European Review of Economic History 9 (2005), 35-60. 
73 C. Beatty, S. Fothergill, T.Gore and R.Powell, The Real Rate of Unemployment 2007 (Sheffield 
Hallam University, 2007), 22. 
74 D.Webster, J. Arnott, J.Brown, I. Turok, R.Mitchell and E. Macdonald, ‘Falling Incapacity Benefit 
claims in a former industrial city: policy impacts or labour market improvement?’ Policy Studies 31  
(2010), 163-85  
75 S. Nickell, ‘’Introduction’ to special issue on the labour market, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and 
Statistics 63 (2001), 623. 
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industrialization has been a feature of cities like Edinburgh and London, as well as the 
classic ‘industrial cities’ like Glasgow and Newcastle. 76  Nickell summarises the 
position thus: ‘the huge decline in the relative demand for unskilled workers has 
outstripped the fall in their relative supply. This has led directly to significant falls in 
their relative pay and very large increases in their unemployment, inactivity and 
sickness rates. These disadvantages then tend to interact with other local social and 
economic conditions to make their situation worse’. 77 
 
Alongside the rise in unemployment since the 1970s has come a deterioration 
in the relative position of the unemployed. In the 1960s unemployment pay was 
adjusted upwards according to previous earnings levels to encourage labour mobility. 
Even in the 1980s, it is striking that however much the Thatcher government wanted 
to politically defeat the miners, it was willing to offer quite generous benefits to 
unemployed miners, including, famously encouraging them to claim invalidity 
benefit, which paid better than unemployment pay (and also massaged down the 
unemployment figures). 78 But the trend in unemployment pay relative to average 
incomes has been downwards since the 1980s, and this policy has been reinforced 
under the Coalition. 79 So since the ‘golden age’ unemployment, much of it linked to 
changing patterns of labour demand, has become more prevalent, and more painful 
when experienced. 
 
                                                 
76 R. Rodger and R. Madgin, 'Inspiring Capital? Deconstructing myths and reconstructing urban 
environments, Edinburgh, 1860–2010' Urban History  40 (2013),  507-529; D. Graham and N. Spence. 
‘Contemporary de-industrialisation and tertiarisation in the London economy.’ Urban Studies 32 
(1995), 885-911. For Glasgow, J. MacInnes, ‘The De-industrialisation of Glasgow’, Scottish Affairs, 11 
(1995), 73-95. 
77 Nickell, ’Introduction’, 623. 
78 C. Beatty, and S.Fothergill,  ‘Disability benefits in an age of austerity’ Social Policy and 
Administration  49 (2015), 161-181. 
79 A.Glyn, Capitalism Unleashed (Oxford, 2006), 114-6; Nickell, ‘Fundamental change’, p.724. 
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The third ‘resolution’ of the trilemma has been an expansion of public 
employment. This growth has been obscured by the highly eccentric way in which 
public sector employment is defined by the Office for National Statistics: ‘the 
difference between the public and private sector is determined by where control lies, 
rather than by ownership or whether or not the entity is publicly financed’. 80 This 
definition means that not only are all employees in further and higher education 
treated as part of the private sector, along with all GPs, but so are the much more 
numerous workers in out-sourced activities supplied to the NHS, local authorities and 
other public bodies. But fortunately we have the analysis of researchers at the Centre 
for Research on Socio-Cultural Change (CRESC) in Manchester, who have used a 
much more satisfactory definition whereby, if more than half of an entity’s activities 
are publicly-funded, it is deemed a part of the public sector.81 They estimate what 
they christen para-state employment, producing figures back to 1998, by adjusting the 
ONS category published in the Quarterly Public Sector Employee Survey. The 
adjustment is done by taking the industries in the Standard Industrial Classification 
and making an informed judgement about how far each of these is reliant on the 
public purse. On this basis they calculate that total state and para-state employment 
together grew from 5.6 million in 1978 to 8.0 million by 2008, 1.7 million more than 
the official estimate.82  Of course, the fact that many of these para-state jobs are with 
private sector companies does matter; it generally leads to different employment 
                                                 
80 ONS definition quoted in J. Cribb, R. Disney and L. Sibieta, ‘The public sector workforce: past, 
present and future’ London, Institute for Fiscal Studies, Briefing Note 145 February 2014. For further 
discussion of these issues, Tomlinson ‘From "distribution of industry" to "local Keynesianism": an 
unacknowledged policy revolution?’ British Politics 7 (2012), 204-223. 
81 J. Buchanan, J. Froud, S.Johal, A. Leaver and K. Williams, ‘Undisclosed and unsustainable: 
problems of the UK National Business Model’, (Manchester, CRESC, 2009). These calculations are 
similar to those in Centre for Cities, ‘Cities Outlook 2014’, (London, 2014). These figures include 
employment in universities as ‘public sector’. 
82 J. Froud, S. Johal, J.Law, A.Leaver and K. Williams ‘Rebalancing the economy (or buyer’s 
remorse)’ (Manchester, CRESC, 2011), 18. These figures tell a quite different story from that based on 
the official data: A.Newell, ‘Structural change’ in Crafts, Gazeley and Newell, Work and Pay, 45-6. 
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conditions and less scope for trade union organization. But the important point is that 
these jobs continue to be publicly-funded.   
 
Table 3.  State and ‘para-state’ employment in the UK, 1978-2008 
1978 5.6 million 
1987 6.2 million 
1997 6.7 million 
2008 8.0 million 
 
Source: J.Froud, S. Johal, J. Law, A.Leaver and K.Williams, ‘Rebalancing the economy (or buyer’s 
remorse)’ (CRESC, Manchester, 2011), 18. 
 
 
The majority of these jobs have been in education, health and social care. The 
mechanisms of this expansion are complex, but a large part of the explanation is the 
high income elasticity of demand for health and education observed by Baumol. 
Fiscal pressures, in combination with market fundamentalist ideology, have meant 
that this expansion of public sector services has increasingly been done by cheapening 
labour in this sector by contracting out. So while there have been lots of well-paid and 
relatively secure public sector jobs, these have been accompanied by burgeoning 
numbers of low-paid and insecure posts in the ‘parastate’ sector.  
 
This point about changes in the labour market in the public sector emphasizes 
the general point that de-industrialization has not been just about the creation of 
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‘Macjobs’. Millward’s 83 data emphasizes the service sector’s changing 
composition—with growth concentrated in public services and retail up to the 1970s, 
but in business services thereafter (though, as suggested above, the official data he 
uses seriously understates the aggregate growth of the public sector). The latter 
included a large number of well-paid jobs.  But Millward’s analysis was written 
before the huge rise in officially-recorded public sector jobs under the Labour 
government after the turn of the century. Some of these (eg doctors and nurses) were 
high quality jobs, but many were not. Private sector service jobs are equally 
diverse. 84  
 
De-industrialization has impacted differentially upon men and women. With 
the significant exception of textiles, most of the sectors making up industry were 
heavily male-dominated, so in a direct sense de-industrialization destroyed many 
more men’s jobs than women’s. 85 This effectively reduced one of the main barriers to 
women’s entry into the labour market, which of course has surged in the post-
industrial period.86  While many service sectors display a clear gendered hierarchy in 
the jobs they offer, horizontal job segregation has been much reduced. A great divide 
now runs between part-time (mainly women) and full-time workers, with many higher 
paid jobs effectively closed to the former group. This matters much more to women 
workers than their continued striking under-representation in ‘plant and machine 
operatives’, the biggest category of lower-skilled industrial workers.87 
                                                 
83 R. Millward, ‘The rise of the service economy’ in R.Floud and P. Johnson (eds.), The Cambridge 
Economic History of Modern Britain vol. III Structural Change and Growth, 1939-2000 (Cambridge, 
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While legislation and social change has contributed to the rapid growth of the 
number of women entering the labour force, we can regard de-industrialization as 
having at least contributed to one of the most important economic and social changes 
in post-war Britain. 88 
     IV 
 
The core aim of this article is to argue for the central significance of de-
industrialization, defined by its employment effects, in changing the British economy, 
and in shifting the pattern of economic welfare. 
 
As noted in the introduction to this paper, Britain’s de-industrialization has 
been part of a common European pattern. Until the 1970s ‘the UK stood out with 
Germany as “workshop economies” with an unusually high share of manufacturing 
employment. While this share has declined everywhere, the UK has now joined the 
pack with an average share of manufacturing employment considerably below 
Germany’s.’89 But the speed of this change has been very fast. Britain’s proportion of 
industrial workers has fallen further than almost any other country because of the high 
level from which it began, and the speed of contraction was especially fast in 1979-
82. While a long-run process, there is no doubt that, as Crafts puts it, the 1980s 
marked ‘a major break from what had hitherto been a more inclusive type of 
economic growth.’90 
 
                                                 
88 S. Horrell, ‘Living standards in Britain 1900-2000: women’s century?’ National Institute Economic 
Review 172 (2000), 62-77. 
89 K. Coutts, A. Glyn and B. Rowthorn,’ Structural change under New Labour’ Cambridge Journal of 
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One way of summarising the consequences is to see de-industrialization in 
Britain as bringing a major increases in both inequality and economic insecurity. That 
Britain has experienced a rapid increase in inequality since the 1970s is well-known.91 
But evidence across the twentieth century also shows the priority the population 
attached to economic security. And this concern was of course at the heart of 
Beveridge’s social security project.92  De-industrialization has acted in a significant 
way to increase insecurity and hence harm economic welfare. 93  
 
Keynes prediction about the future with which this essay started was written at 
a time when globalization was clearly in retreat. Plainly the globalization evident in 
the world since the 1970s has exposed more of the economy to international 
competition than he could possibly have anticipated. Most importantly, significant 
parts of the outputs of the service sector, especially in the wake of the ICT 
‘revolution’, are internationally traded. But on the other hand, the demand for services 
which are sheltered has also grown immensely, whether these be private sector 
services such as retailing and distribution, entertainment and personal services such as 
hairdressing or public sector services, notably education, health and social care. These 
are the activities where the ‘personal touch’ is very difficult to displace, and where 
therefore increasing demand translates into approximately equal increases in 
employment. 
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What of the political consequences of de-industrialization? Political change is 
never reducible to shifts in the economy, but it seems clear that de-industrialization 
has undercut pre-existing political assumptions and structures in a number of ways. 
For example, it has been argued that it has been one factor in displacing producer by 
consumer politics.94 It has contributed substantially to the rising political power of 
financial interests, as the power of both organized industrial capital and organized 
industrial workers has weakened.  95  De-industrialization is also very important in 
understanding the rise of Scottish nationalism.96 
 
But perhaps the most intriguing and important aspect of the political 
consequences of de-industrialization is its significance for neo-liberalism. It is 
standard in the historical and political science literature to see Britain since the 1970s 
and 1980s as having been subject to a successful neo-liberal or market fundamentalist 
political project. 97 But de-industrialization has, as suggested above, been 
accompanied in the same period by rising numbers of state employees and growing 
subsidisation of jobs. This is especially ironic, given that the freeing of the labour 
market from state intervention has always been a key objective for neo-liberals. 
 Effectively we have moved towards a huge ‘new Speenhamland’ system of 
‘outdoor relief’ of the employed; or, viewed differently, large subsidies to employers, 
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which has mitigated, but not cured the problem of poverty-level wages. 98  The 
original Speenhamland system was introduced in a parish of that name near Newbury 
in the South of England in 1795. Under that system, wages deemed to be below those 
sufficient for subsistence were subsidised through the Poor Law out of taxes (local 
poor rates). This system was not actually new, nor did it become universal, but it has 
been widely recognised as symbolising the rejection of a crucial principle of liberal 
political economy. 99 The principle is that wages should be determined in a market, 
and should not be subsidised out of the public purse. Hostility to Speenhamland was 
widespread amongst the governing class of the time and especially amongst political 
economists, who argued that such a system created no incentives for the workers to 
maximize their wages, nor for employers to pay what was affordable to them. These 
perverse consequences were held-up as the typical result of well-intentioned but 
misguided intervention in the labour market. Eventually, under the Poor Law 
Amendment Act of 1834, such subsidies were outlawed, and liberal political economy 
was triumphant. 
 The reinvention of Speenhamland has come from a clash between neo-liberal 
principles and the impact of de-industrialization on the labour market. A core belief of 
British neo-liberals in the 1970s and 1980s was that unemployment was in large part 
the consequence of unemployment pay being too high relative to wages, so 
incentivising the unemployed not to seek work. 100 From this premise two policies 
followed; reducing unemployment pay (pursued from 1981), whilst simultaneously 
increasing ‘in-work’ benefits. Initially the latter were limited in scale and scope, but 
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as shown in section three above, they grew rapidly as the number of poorly paid 
‘lousy’ jobs increased.101  
 
Much has recently been written on the extent to which the 2008 financial crisis will 
lead to the reversal of the British neo-liberal experiment. 102 But it may be that a 
bigger challenge to that experiment will continue to flow from a longer-term and 
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